Algorithmic Bias: On the Implicit Biases of Social Technology by Johnson, Gabbrielle
Algorithmic Bias




Often machine learning programs inherit social patterns reflected in their training data
without any directed effort by programmers to include such biases. Computer scien-
tists call this algorithmic bias. This paper explores the relationship between machine
bias and human cognitive bias. In it, I argue similarities between algorithmic and
cognitive biases indicate a disconcerting sense in which sources of bias emerge out of
seemingly innocuous patterns of information processing. The emergent nature of this
bias obscures the existence of the bias itself, making it difficult to identify, mitigate,
or evaluate using standard resources in epistemology and ethics. I demonstrate these
points in the case of mitigation techniques by presenting what I call ‘the Proxy Prob-
lem’. One reason biases resist revision is that they rely on proxy attributes, seemingly
innocuous attributes that correlate with socially-sensitive attributes, serving as proxies
for the socially-sensitive attributes themselves. I argue that in both human and algo-
rithmic domains, this problem presents a common dilemma for mitigation: attempts to
discourage reliance on proxy attributes risk a tradeoff with judgement accuracy. This
problem, I contend, admits of no purely algorithmic solution.
1 Introduction
On March 23rd, 2016, Microsoft Corporation released Tay, an artificial intelligence (AI)
Twitter chatbot intended to mimic the language patterns of a 19-year-old American girl.
Tay operated by learning from human Twitter users with whom it interacted. Only 16
hours after its launch, Tay was shut down for authoring a number of tweets endorsing
Nazi ideology and harassing other Twitter users. Among the inflammatory tweets were
those saying “Hitler was right,” those endorsing then-Republican-nominee Donald Trump’s
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proposal that “we’re going to build a wall,” various derogatory remarks about feminists,
as well as claims that “9/11 was an inside job.” When asked about how Tay developed
such a noxious personality, Microsoft responded, “as [Tay] learns, some of its responses
are inappropriate and indicative of the types of interactions some people are having with
it.”1 In other words, Tay’s personality was inherited from the individuals with whom it
was engaging.
The story of Tay highlights an obstacle facing developers of machine learning programs:
algorithmic bias. An AI like Tay, which uses machine learning to capitalize on (or “learn”
from) statistical regularities in human-generated datasets, tends to pick up social patterns
that manifest in human behavior and that are reflected in the data on which it is trained.
In many of these cases, we have reason to suspect that programmers are not explicitly
writing biases toward marginalized demographics into their software’s code.2 Instead, it
appears the biases in some sense implicitly emerge from the algorithms’ operating on the
data, mimicking the biases reflected in the data themselves. The existence of algorithmic
biases undermines the assumptions that computer-based decision-making is more objec-
tive and accurate than human decision-making or that it is entirely free from the social
and political values humans exhibit. The purpose of this paper is to explore further the
connections between the algorithmic and human domain, and to argue that in etiology,
operation, evaluation, and mitigation, human biases and algorithmic biases share impor-
tant similarities. Understanding these similarities, I contend, is critical to succeeding in
philosophical and practical projects concerning either domain.
A core similarity of algorithmic biases and human cognitive biases is that both kinds
of bias can emerge out of seemingly innocuous patterns of information processing. Investi-
gations into the nature of these emergent biases in the domain of machine learning reveal
at least two obstacles for computer programmers: first, often machine learning programs
instantiate so-called “black box” algorithms, i.e., those where it is difficult (and arguably
impossible) for human observers to describe the rationale for a particular outcome; second,
algorithmic biases rely on proxy attributes: seemingly innocuous attributes that correlate
with socially-sensitive attributes, serving as proxies for the socially-sensitive attributes
themselves. These two obstacles exist also in the domain of human cognition, obscur-
ing the existence of biases and making it difficult to identify, mitigate, or evaluate biased
1Price 2016.




decision-making using standard resources in epistemology and ethics. In this paper, I focus
especially on the second obstacle, and I argue that the flexibility in the representational
states and processes that constitute a bias’s operation give rise to what I call ‘the Proxy
Problem’. Biases that operate on proxies cannot be mitigated using any overt filtering
techniques, since eliminating any explicit references to, e.g., race, will be ineffective, as
the decision-making procedure can simply substitute a proxy, e.g., zip codes, resulting in
similar discriminatory effects. In order to eliminate biases of this sort, I argue we need to
focus not on revising particular representational states, but instead on breaking down reli-
able patterns that exist in the interactions between innocuous representational states and
the societal patterns that they encode. However, from this, a second and more profound
dilemma arises for both algorithmic and human decision-making: attempts to discourage
reliance on proxy attributes risk a tradeoff with judgement accuracy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, I present cases where algorithmic biases mimic
patterns of human implicit bias. In §3, I explain how algorithmic biases can manifest
without a program’s containing explicit stereotype rules, which I demonstrate using a
simple toy model of the k-nearest neighbors (kNN) learning algorithm. Then, I argue that
the same applies to human implicit bias, i.e., some cognitive biases influence an individual’s
beliefs about and actions toward other people, but are nevertheless nowhere represented
in that individual’s cognitive repertoire. These similarities highlight the flexibility in the
states and processes that give rise to bias in general. In §4, I demonstrate how this flexibility
in structure causes the Proxy Problem. Finally, I argue that to resolve this problem,
one cannot merely focus on revising the inner-workings of the decision-making procedures.
Instead, I argue, we must refocus mitigation techniques to break down the reliable patterns
of interaction among states within these processes and the wider environment in which
they’re embedded, a point I demonstrate by showing how one might frustrate the reliance
on proxy attributes like skin color and dressing feminine in making decisions about whether
someone is a worthy presidential candidate. I end by considering the aforementioned
tradeoffs of this sort of approach in real-world decision-making.
This paper takes place against the backdrop of a theory I develop in other work, wherein
biases of many varieties form a natural kind. According to this theory, bias exists every-
where induction does, and thus, the world of computational bias is vast: biases can be
cognitive, algorithmic, social, non-social, epistemically reliable, epistemically unreliable,
morally reprehensible, or morally innocuous. I contend that understanding the features
common to this natural kind bias, which algorithmic bias shares, is critical to making
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progress on more practical aims that engagement with biases demands. If ultimately our
aim is to eliminate biases that are problematic—either epistemically or morally—then
our first step should be to understand the origins and operation of biases more generally.
Recognizing this natural kind helps to highlight that many of the roadblocks facing the
amelioration of harmful biases are not unique to any particular kind of bias, algorithmic
included. Indeed, as will become evident by the end of the paper, there are no purely
algorithmic solutions to the problems that face algorithmic bias.
2 Evidence for Algorithmic Bias
I begin by surveying some of the evidence that suggests machine biases mimic typical
bias patterns formed from human implicit biases, laying the groundwork for commonalities
between the two.
Consider a study by Caliskan et al. (2017) on word-embedding machine learning. This
study found that parsing software trained on a dataset called “the common crawl”—an
assemblage of 840 billion words collected by crawling the internet—resulted in the pro-
gram producing “human-like semantic biases” that replicated well-known trends in results
of indirect measures for human implicit biases. These biases included the tendency to
more often pair stereotypical female names with family words than career terms, stereo-
typical African-American names with unpleasant words rather than pleasant words, and
stereotypical male names with science and math terms rather than art terms. A plausible
explanation of this phenomenon comes from looking at the patterns within the training
data themselves, i.e., patterns in online language use. For example, computer scientist
Seth Stephens-Davidowitz’s analyses of Google data trends show people are two-and-a-half
times more likely to search “Is my son gifted?” than “Is my daughter gifted?”. This sug-
gests that online texts encode human social biases that often associate males with inherent
intelligence.3 It seems that the word-embedding software picked up on and mimicked these
patterns. On this result, co-author Arvind Narayanan writes, “natural language neces-
sarily contains human biases, and the paradigm of training machine learning on language
corpora means that AI will inevitably imbibe these biases as well.”4
Examples of similar phenomena abound. In 1988, St George’s Hospital Medical School’s





applicants “written after careful analysis of the way in which the staff were making these
choices” unfairly rejected women and individuals with non-European sounding names.5
Similarly, a study by Datta et al. (2015, 105) found that Google’s ad-targeting software
resulted in “males [being] shown ads encouraging the seeking of coaching services for high
paying jobs more than females.” And finally, a study by Klare et al. (2012) demonstrated
that face recognition software, some of which is used by law enforcement agencies across
the US, use algorithms that are consistently less accurate on women, African Americans,
and younger people.6 As the use of machine learning programs proliferates, the social
consequences of their biases become increasingly threatening.7 One particularly jarring
example of these consequences was highlighted by a 2016 ProPublica analysis that revealed
software being utilized across the country to predict recidivism is biased against black
people, often associating African American attributes with crime, a common result found
in implicit bias measures.8 The algorithm under investigation was nearly twice as likely to
falsely flag black defendants as future criminals than white defendants, while inaccurately
labeling white defendants as low-risk more often than black defendants.9
These examples demonstrate that machine bias exists and that the patterns of such
bias mimic well-known implicit bias patterns in humans. However, we need not from the
5Lowry and Macpherson 1988, 657.
6See also Wu and Zhang 2016.
7For a comprehensive overview of the current state of affairs regarding machine learning programs in
social technology, see O’Neil 2016.
8See, for example, Eberhardt et al. 2004.
9Angwin et al. 2016. The expose´ concerned the computer software COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions). COMPAS has received an enormous amount of attention
in philosophy, machine learning, and everyday discussions of algorithmic bias, much of which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Important for my purposes, however, is the fact that many of the issues it raises are
not unique to either it or algorithmic decision-making in general. For example, recent work by Kleinberg
et al. (2016) and Chouldechova (2016) identifies the three intuitive conditions any risk-assessment program
must achieve in order to be fair and unbiased. These criteria include first, that the algorithm is well-
calibrated, i.e., if it identifies a set of people as having a probability z of constituting positive instances,
then approximately a z fraction of this set should indeed be positive instances; second, that it balance
the positive class, i.e., the average score received by people constituting positive instances should be the
same in each group; and third, that it balance the negative class, i.e., the average score received by people
constituting the negative instances should be the same in each group (Kleinberg et al. 2016, 2). Strikingly,
Kleinberg et al. (2016) demonstrate that in cases where base rates differ and our programs are not perfect
predictors—which subsumes most cases—these three conditions necessarily trade off from one another. This
means most (if not all) programs used in real-world scenarios will fail to satisfy all three fairness conditions.
There is no such thing as an unbiased program in this sense. More strikingly, researchers take this so-called
‘impossibility result’ to generalize to all predictors, whether they be algorithmic or human decision-makers
(Kleinberg et al. 2016, 6 and Miconi 2017, 4). For a compelling argument of how best to prioritize different
notions of fairness, see Hellman 2019.
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existence of these biases infer that programmers are writing explicitly racist or sexist code.
Instead, it is possible that such biases emerge out of the operation of seemingly innocuous
code paired with statistical regularities of the training data. These cases of algorithmic
bias can be demonstrated with a toy model using a simple k-nearest neighbors algorithm,
which I turn to next.
3 Varieties of Bias
3.1 Algorithmic Bias
I now present a simple walkthrough of how machine learning programs operate.10 Machine
learning programs come in three basic forms: supervised learning, unsupervised learning,
and reinforcement learning. In what follows, I begin by focusing on the simpler cases of
supervised learning programs. I return to the more complicated cases at the end of the
section. There are two main stages of a supervised learning program’s operation: first a
training phase, followed by a test phase. During the training phase, the program is trained
on pre-labeled data. This affords the program the opportunity to “learn” the relationships
between features and labels. The second phase consists in applying the resulting predictive
model to test data, which outputs a classification for each new test datum on the basis of
its features.
For example, imagine that you’re creating a program that you intend to use for the
simple classification task of predicting whether an object is a ski or a snowboard. You
might begin by identifying features of skis and snowboards that you think are relevant
for determining an object’s classification into either category. In theory, you can choose
an indefinite number of relevant features.11 For our purposes, we’ll focus on just two:
length and width.12 We begin stage one by training our program on pre-labeled data
10Ideally, I would present a walkthrough of the operation of one of the algorithms discussed above. Un-
fortunately, providing a detailed analysis of one of these algorithms is difficult, if not impossible, since
information relating to the operation of commercial machine learning programs is often intentionally in-
accessible for the sake of competitive commercial advantage or client security purposes. Even if these
algorithms were made available for public scrutiny, many likely instantiate so-called ‘black-box’ algorithms,
i.e., those where it is difficult if not impossible for human programmers to understand or explain why any
particular outcome occurs. This lack of transparency with respect to their operation creates a myriad of
concerning questions about fairness, objectivity, and accuracy. However, these issues are beyond the scope
of this discussion.
11The problem of which features are most relevant for some classification task will itself raise important
philosophical issues, some of which I return to in my discussion of the Proxy Problem in §4.
12This case is discussed in more detail by Daume´ III (2015, 30-32).
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called ‘training data’. These include many instances of already-categorized objects. We
can represent the relationships between the relevant features and classifications for the
known data by plotting them on a two-dimensional features space as follows:
Figure 1: Training Phase - Skis vs. Snowboards
Each data-point specifies two things: the feature values, i.e., values corresponding to its
length and width; and a class label, i.e., a label corresponding to its classification as a ski
or snowboard. Per Figure 1, the objects in the test data that are longer but not as wide
tend to be skis, while the objects that are wider but not as long tend to be snowboards.
In the next phase of the program, the algorithm gets applied to new, unclassified data
called ‘test data’, and the aim of the program is to classify each datum as either a ski
or a snowboard on the basis of its feature values. One way for the program to do this
is to classify new instances on the basis of their proximity in the feature space to known
classifications. For example, say we had a new object that we didn’t know was a ski or
a snowboard, but we did know had a certain length and width. Based on these feature
values, the datum is plotted in the feature space as follows:
Figure 2: Test Phase - Skis vs. Snowboards
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The program can then use the test datum’s relationship to the other data points to make
a novel classification. There are a variety of ways this new data point is related to the
other data points, and thus a variety of methods on which to make the new classification.
One intuitive method is to identify a number k of its nearest neighbors and allow them to
“vote”. For example, if we set k to 5, then the program will decide on the basis of the five
nearest neighbors in the feature space. As evident in Figure 2, the five nearest neighbors
comprise one ski and four snowboards. Since the majority vote in this case results in
snowboards, the program classifies the test instance as a snowboard.
This same method can be used for any number of classification tasks based on relevant
attributes, including those overlapping with stereotypical judgements based on members
of marginalized social groups. For example, imagine an engineer is creating a program
that classifies individuals as good or bad with computers. Let’s say she thinks one relevant
property for determining this classification is a person’s age. Thus, she trains the program
on many instances of individuals she labels as a certain age and as either good or bad with
computers. The following is an example of how these instances might end up plotted on a
one-dimensional feature space:
Figure 3: Training Phase - Good vs. Bad with computers
Per Figure 3, the data in this example are skewed: those individuals who are bad with
computers are clustered near the end of the line, while those good with computers are near
the beginning. Prima facie, this data pattern appears problematic in some sense. There
are many ways test data can come to be patterned like this, and it is worth taking time
to explore a few of them. Two ways the data might come to be patterned like this involve
bad data collection practices. For example, imagine that the programmer pulled training
data from a local library on the same day the library was hosting an after-school event
during which high-schoolers provide social media training to residents of a local assisted
living facility. In this case, we would not expect the data to be representative of the general
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population: her sample would have a greater proportion of both tech-savvy young people
(compared to the general population of young people) and elderly individuals who struggle
with computer technology (compared to the general population of elderly individuals). The
second way our training data can be skewed via problematic data collection practices is by
a failure to accurately label the samples. For example, if the person labeling the training
data in our case was—due to her own biases and prejudices—more likely to label elderly
individuals as bad with computers even when they weren’t, then we should still expect a
mismatch between the training data and the real world. Although seemingly contrived,
these examples demonstrate an important lesson: a machine learning program is only as
good as the data on which it is trained, giving rise to the oft-cited motto “garbage in,
garbage out.” If the data going into the training period are problematic, then we can
expect the generalizations the program makes based on those data to be problematic as
well.
However, there is a third possibility for how data can come to be patterned like this
that does not involve bad data collection practices, but is of great philosophical interest
nonetheless. It is arguably the source of many of the real-world cases of algorithmic bias
discussed in this paper. It occurs when even randomly selected data might reflect social
biases because such patterns are ubiquitous in the environment. For example, if it turns
out that, in general, the elderly are statistically more likely to be bad with computers,
then even carefully collected data might reflect this problematic trend. Crucially, this
claim itself makes no commitments about the source of the problematic trend in the wider
environment, and certainly need not entail any claims about the natural dispositions of
elderly individuals. Instead, the trend that elderly people are more likely to be bad with
computers—and other objectionable patterns concerning vulnerable demographics—might
be a result of structural and societal discrimination. Indeed, given that our environment is
widely shaped by historical patterns of injustice and discrimination, we can expect many
problematic social patterns to be ubiquitous in this way. Thus, one of the primary questions
for philosophers of machine learning and computer programmers to address is the following:
particularly in the social domains in which this technology is employed, does there exist
such a thing as non-problematic training data and, if so, how do we attain such data? If
not, there seems to be a philosophically robust sense in which, at least in these domains,
there is no alternative to “garbage in,” and, thus, there will likewise be no alternative to
“garbage out.”
We see this lesson of “garbage in, garbage out” unfold when we again apply our kNN
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algorithm to this example:
Figure 4: Test Phase - Good vs. Bad with computers
In this case, the five nearest neighbors to the target will include a majority of individuals
who are bad with computers. Thus, the new individual will, on the basis of their age, be
labeled as bad with computers.
With those individuals who are older patterning roughly with those who are bad with
computers (and vice versa for young individuals and good with computers), we could think
of this entire dataset as reflecting the social generalization (or, loosely, the “stereotype”)
that elderly people are bad with computers. Importantly though, notice that this content
is never explicitly represented as a rule in the program’s code. Instead, the algorithm
operates on a simple Euclidean distance calculation involving the proximity of the test
instance to the training instances in the feature space. Rather than the stereotype being
explicitly represented as a rule, it implicitly emerges out of the distribution of training
instances in the feature space. It is this distribution of training instances that gives rise to
a bias toward the elderly.
Most important, in cases where the stereotype rule isn’t explicitly represented in a
program, the program still operates as if it represented such a rule: it still classifies
individuals as being bad with computers on the basis of their age, with elderly individuals
being more likely to be labeled as bad with computers. I call biases that operate in this
way truly implicit biases, and algorithmic biases—such as those arising in the examples
above—are one form such biases can take.13
In what follows, I draw an analogy of this case to human cognitive biases to demonstrate
that, as with algorithmic bias, cognitive biases may be truly implicit. This flexibility in
the states and processes that give rise to bias creates complications in the identification,
evaluation, and mitigation of bias in general.




Although occurring in different domains, algorithmic biases and human biases have impor-
tant structural commonalities. To demonstrate this, imagine a paradigmatic case of social
cognitive bias. For example, imagine that a fellow academic attempts to help his elderly
colleague Jan join a Zoom interview.14 When asked why he did this, he explains that it is
because Jan is elderly, and he believes elderly people are bad with computers. Here, the
inference the colleague is making is straightforward:
(i) Jan is elderly.
(ii) Elderly people are bad with computers.
∴ (iii) Jan is bad with computers.
This case is typical of cases of so-called ‘explicit bias’, since the colleague is completely
aware that he is drawing conclusions about Jan based on his beliefs about the elderly and
Jan’s belonging to that group. The notion ‘bias’ is often used to refer to different aspects
of decision-making indicative of bias.15 For simplicity, my focus will be on the collection
of states and processes that, when coupled with a belief that some individual belongs to a
social group, produces a conclusion that that individual has properties stereotypical of the
social group. I call this collection of states and processes ‘the bias-construct’, and the bias-
construct in this example is the stereotype belief that elderly people are bad with computers
(together with whatever inferential processes are necessary to derive the conclusion).
Largely, extant theories of social bias regard implicit biases as involving bias-constructs
that we are not aware or conscious of and explicit biases as involving those that we are.
This is a claim that implicit and explicit biases differ with respect to their conscious
accessibility.16 Bias-constructs that are unconscious might be, on the one hand, stored and
represented like other mental states; or, more curiously, they might be “merely encoded”
in the patterns of other states being processed. In this case, the states and processes
underlying them are analogous with respect to their representational status to algorithmic
biases—they are truly implicit.17
14This example and parts of its description are borrowed from my “The Structure of Bias” (forthcoming).
15See Holroyd and Sweetman 2016 for discussion and examples.
16Recently theorists including Gawronski et al. (2006) and Hahn et al. (2014) have disputed that implicit
biases are in fact unconscious. I don’t take up the dispute in detail here because it is largely irrelevant for
my claims regarding the representational nature of bias-constructs.
17Corneille and Hutter (2020) survey conceptual ambiguities in the use of ‘implicit’ in attitude research.
According to them, among the possible interpretations present in standard literature are implicit as auto-
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To see this point, it helps to notice that distinct bias-constructs can systematically relate
bias-inputs and bias-outputs in similar ways. Imagine another colleague also attempts to
help Jan join a Zoom interview, but when asked why she did this, she is unable to offer any
explanation.18 Like the previous colleague, she too thinks that Jan is elderly and comes to
the conclusion that Jan needs help with the Zoom interview; however, unlike the previous
colleague, she reports believing that elderly individuals are just as good with computers as
anyone else is. Here, the inference this colleague is making is less clear:
(i) Jan is elderly.
(iii) Jan is bad with computers.
One possible explanation for the transition between (i) and (iii) is the existence of an un-
conscious stereotype belief that elderly people are bad with computers. However, crucially,
other combinations of states and processes can just as easily fill this role. For example, it
might be that what is happening in this colleague’s head is a combination of states and
processes that are similar to the kNN algorithm discussed above that classified individuals
as being bad with computers on the basis of their age and similarities to past individuals
this subject has encountered. If so, then as in the case of algorithmic bias, the transition
from (i) to (iii) could occur without ever explicitly representing a stereotype. That is, prin-
ciples governing the transitions from the belief that Jan is elderly to the belief that she’s
bad with computers are plausibly merely encoded in just the same way as the algorithmic
biases above. In this case, her bias is truly implicit.19
There are several important takeaways from the discussion in this section. The first
concerns the generality of bias. The features that are common to cases of problematic social
biases generalize to non-problematic, non-social biases. Notice that the features that gave
rise to a bias in the example of elderly people being bad with computer and young people
being good with computers were present also in the example of skis being long and thin
and snowboards being short and wide. In both cases, generalizations emerged not from
an explicitly represented stereotype-like rule, but rather from run-of-the-mill operations on
datasets that encoded the relevant stereotype-like patterns. As demonstrated, these same
features of algorithmic bias generalize to non-algorithmic, cognitive biases as well.
matic, implicit as indirect, and implicit as associative (as well as hybrids). The interpretation of implicit as
truly implicit, i.e., non-representational, is largely ignored or altogether absent from these interpretations.
See also Holroyd et al. 2017, 3-7.
18More standard in cases like this, she might instead offer an explanation that, upon investigation, is
revealed to be confabulation.
19See my “The Structure of Bias” (forthcoming).
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These points evoke an understanding of a natural kind bias, under which problematic
social algorithmic and cognitive bias emerge as species. This broader kind is normatively
neutral and explanatorily robust. Against common usage, it includes biases that are epis-
temically reliable and morally unproblematic. This is in tension with the notion of bias
employed in many everyday discussions of algorithmic bias that bakes into the term neg-
ative connotations. Understandably, some theorists might prefer to retain this negative
valence associated with the notion bias. However, I believe that resisting this tendency so
as to see the commonalities of the general kind bias shepherds in a variety of theoretical
upshots, which I regard as critical to achieving the common aim of combating morally
or epistemically problematic biases. On this general understanding, biases are necessary
solutions to underdetermination, and thus, bias exists anywhere induction does. The over-
arching reason for adopting a normatively neutral notion of bias is that regarding bias as
constitutively problematic implies that the alternative is to adopt a form of objectivity
that would make inductive reasoning impossible.20
Induction in the face of underdetermination arises in a variety of domains, and studying
how biases are employed as solutions in one can be fruitful for understanding their oper-
ation in another. Consider the following helpful analogy between the etiologies of visual
perceptual biases and problematic social biases. Imagine a simple robot built to navigate
through an obstacle course. A robot trained on machine learning models intended to mimic
the human visual perceptual system will face an underdetermination problem, since the
evidence of the 3-D physical environment that it has access to will be underdetermined
by mere 2-D proximal stimulations of light pattern registrations. Thus, it will necessarily
have to adopt various biases about the environment. In our natural environment, for ex-
ample, light tends to come from above. So, if a robot is going to successfully navigate the
physical environment, it will need to pick up on and utilize this assumption when making
judgements about its surroundings. This assumption isn’t perfect, and it wouldn’t work
in environments where light doesn’t come from above, but in our environment, it tends to
get things right. Drawing the analogy to social biases, our social environment is shaped
by a variety of racist and discriminatory practices. So, if a machine learning program is
aiming to make predictions in line with our current social landscape—i.e., built to navigate
20I discuss these points in greater detail in my “The Structure of Bias” (forthcoming), following consider-
ations presented by Antony (2001, 2016). For other arguments in favor of and against including normative
and accuracy conditions in the definition of bias and the related notion stereotype, see Munton 2019b,
Beeghly 2015, and Blum 2004.
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our current social environment—it necessarily adopts and utilizes assumptions that mimic
patterns presently existing in the data on which it is trained. Thus, assumptions that
encode problematic stereotypes will inevitably be adopted and perpetuated by machine
learning programs. This will continue until we shape a new social environment for which
such assumptions will be ill-placed.21
Another aspect of the generality of bias is the flexibility in states and processes that
give rise to it.22 I’ve already demonstrated this flexibility by giving instances of where
the same bias against the elderly can emerge either as an explicitly represented stereo-
type rule or as a combination of innocuous rules on a particular data set. This point is
compounded as we look at more examples, especially in the algorithmic domain. It is
important to note that the toy kNN model I have presented is—for the ease of exposi-
tion and understanding—much simpler than real-world machine learning programs. In the
range of more complicated cases that make up actual machine learning programs, e.g.,
those relying on high-dimensional feature spaces that encode collections of a great number
of feature values, it seems plausible that these points about flexibility will be even more
pressing. For example, deep neural nets and unsupervised learning programs are less likely
to be adopting anything close to the explicitly represented stereotype-like rules that are
often assumed in discussions of bias. They are also unlikely to use category labels that
correspond to the overt target labels that show up in stereotype generalizations. Yet, they
exhibit problematic biases all the same. It is this flexibility that will pave the way for the
Proxy Problem, which I turn to next.
4 The Proxy Problem
At this point, I’ve argued that similar discriminatory patterns can emerge from a range of
decision-making procedures with variable states and processes. Here, I discuss a problem
that emerges from this fact: the Proxy Problem.
Machine learning programmers have long struggled with eliminating algorithmic bi-
ases that are based on so-called ‘proxy attributes’: seemingly innocuous attributes that
correlate with socially sensitive attributes, serving as proxies for the socially-sensitive at-
tributes themselves.23 Often, engineers attempt to protect disadvantaged social groups by
21I return to these points at the end of §4.
22In the case of implicit human cognitive bias, this point about flexibility is often raised under the heading
of the heterogeneity of bias. See, in particular, Holroyd and Sweetman 2016.
23See, for example, Adler et al. (2016)’s discussion of how to audit so-called ‘black box’ algorithms that
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preventing classification algorithms from performing tasks on the basis of socially-sensitive
features in cases where using these features would be discriminatory. For example, it would
be both legally and morally problematic to allow a program to categorize candidates as
either eligible or ineligible for a mortgage loan based on those candidates’ races. As a
result, programmers attempt to prevent any explicit reliance on race by including filters
that block the program from labeling individuals on the basis of race. However, often these
filters fail to prevent the program from adopting proxy attributes that correlate with the
socially-sensitive attributes. For example, rather than labeling some individual as ‘African
American’, the program might label them based on their zip codes.24 Since neighborhood
demographics are often racially homogeneous, a person’s zip code often correlates with their
race. Thus, an algorithm utilizing the former might operate very similar to it utilizing the
latter.25
Likewise, a proxy attribute could be used in the bad-with-computers classification al-
gorithm above to produce similar results. Instead of explicitly relying on an individual’s
age to plot them in the feature space, a programmer might instead rely on a proxy, say
their degree of trust in Fox News.26
Figure 5: Proxy - Good vs. Bad with computers
Here, the algorithm need not make any explicit reference to age. Most important, in cases
where the socially sensitive attribute isn’t explicitly represented in a program, the program
appear to rely on proxy attributes in lieu of target attributes.
24To take an example from earlier, the recidivism algorithm COMPAS produces patterns discriminatory
toward African Americans despite race demographic information not being explicitly included in the infor-
mation given to it about each defendant. Instead, it had access to other features that collectively correlated
with race.
25For reasons soon to be discussed, programmers are forced to rely on proxies. Moreover, the notion
of proxy discrimination is familiar in discussions of discrimination in ethics and law. See, for example,
Alexander 1992, 167-173.
26The median age of Fox News viewers is 65 (Epstein 2016). Although age might not correlate exactly
with perceived trustworthiness, we can assume for simplicity that it does.
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again operates as if it represented such a content: it still classifies individuals in such a
way that elderly individuals are more likely to be labeled as bad with computers.
The same can be said for cognitive biases that rely on proxy attributes. Imagine yet
another colleague whose overt interactions with Jan are the same as the previous two, but
whose reasoning about her is very different. This colleague doesn’t really consider Jan’s
age at all, but does know that she has a high degree of trust in Fox News. We can imagine
his overt reasoning about Jan looks something like this:
(i) Jan really trusts Fox News.
(iii) Jan is bad with computers.
This person might never recognize the connection between the attributes of having a high
degree of trust in Fox News and being elderly. He also never endorses a stereotype of the
form elderly people are bad with computers. Nevertheless, he has a bias that causes him
to treat elderly individuals as being bad with computers.
The insight that biases (cognitive or algorithmic) might operate using proxy attributes
has important implications for mitigation techniques in both domains. Consider yet an-
other classification task. This time, imagine the goal is to categorize individuals as presi-
dential or non-presidential and that the chosen relevant features the procedure relies on are
skin tone and the degree to which a person dresses in a stereotypically feminine manner—
imperfect proxies for race and gender, respectively. Just as in the training phases above,
this procedure utilizes known instances of the target categorization. In this case, let’s
assume it has access to all individuals who have run for the presidency. Based on histor-
ical discriminatory trends, we can imagine the feature space looks very roughly like the
following:27
27This feature space is meant to be a simplification and is not intended to exactly match real-world data.
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Figure 6: Training Phase - Worthy vs. Not Worthy Presidential Candidate
With these training data, we can predict what is likely to happen in the test phase with
an individual who dresses in a stereotypically feminine manner:
Figure 7: Testing Phase - Worthy vs. Not Worthy Presidential Candidate
Such an individual will, on the basis of their feminine presentation, be categorized as not
a U.S. President. Crucially, the proceedure makes no explicit reference to race or gender,
but the results of its operation mimic the results of a procedure that does rely on such
features.
As in the case of emergent bias, although here I use examples that are morally and
politically salient or that rely on various intentional choices of individuals, I intend for the
points I make to generalize to a variety of other cases. That we use some properties to
stand in for others during reasoning is a ubiquitous phenomenon.28 Often in reasoning we
28Cognitive examples where some attributes can stand in for others (and where this is taken to reflect
17 of 26
Algorithmic Bias
are interested in some deep property that goes beyond the properties we have direct access
to. Thus, reliance on proxies will be a necessary feature of most inductive reasoning. In this
general sense—where proxy reasoning occurs any time we use some feature to correlate with
another—proxy use will likewise be ubiquitous.29 Notice that this is true also of machine
learning programs. Programs built for object recognition, say, are rarely in contact with
the actual objects they aim to identify. Instead, they rely on pictures. In this case, some
collection of pixel values will act as a proxy for some other feature, perhaps shape, which
will then act as a proxy for some target natural kind attribute, being a dog, say. So, I don’t
mean to imply that proxies are rare or the result of overly intentional decisions. Rather,
they are often ubiquitous and unwitting.
Computer programmers have long struggled with proxy attributes since programs that
rely on them tend to resist any overt filtering techniques. Eliminating any explicit ref-
erences to a socially sensitive attribute in the program’s code will be ineffective, as the
program can simply substitute reference to a proxy attribute in its place, resulting in sim-
ilar discriminatory effects. Because the program has been tasked with finding the most
efficient and reliable way to classify a new object based on the correlation patterns between
attributes and target features in the data, where there are robust correlations between so-
cially sensitive attributes, proxy attributes, and target features and we’ve ruled out using
the socially sensitive attributes, the next best thing for the program to use will be the
proxy attributes.
One might think that human implicit biases similarly resist revision. That is, if a miti-
gation technique operates on overt, socially-sensitive attributes, and the relevant cognitive
biases instead rely on proxy attributes, then that mitigation technique will fail. If so, we
might borrow mitigation techniques from machine learning. One programming strategy is
to curate the training data in such a way that the problematic features bear no straight-
some quirk underwriting heuristic judgements) are well-studied in empirical work on ‘attribute substitution
effects’. According to the theory, there are some instances where decisions made on the basis of a target
attribute—familiarity, say—are too cognitively demanding. This prompts the cognitive system to shift to a
less cognitively demanding task that relies on some irrelevant, but more easily identifiable attribute—e.g.,
beauty. For discussion, see Kahneman and Frederick 2002 and Monin 2003.
29This is a perfectly adequate first-pass analysis of the notion of proxy as it is used in machine learning.
See, for example, Eubanks (2018, 143-145, 168)’s discussion of using community calls to a child abuse hotline
as a proxy for actual child abuse. However, I believe the key features of proxies that make them a useful
concept in our explanations about discrimination go deeper than this first-pass analysis. Ultimately, I take
the philosophically rich features of proxy discrimination to stem from an externalism about intentionality
and anti-individualism about the natures of representational states, points I discuss further in my “Proxies
Aren’t Intentional, They’re Intentional” (MS).
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forward relationship to the relevant categories, making reliance on them for categorization
ineffective. If we wanted to likewise frustrate the reliance on the proxies in the example
above, one place to start is to introduce more instances of counter-stereotypical exemplars,
as follows:30
Figure 8: Counterstereotypical - Worthy vs. Not Worthy Presidential Candidate
In this case, relying on whether a candidate dresses in a stereotypically feminine manner
will not be a reliable guide in categorizing them as presidential.
This example highlights an avenue for optimism about mitigating truly implicit social
biases in cognition and machines. However, there exist several challenges. Firstly, this
example appears to naively advocate that we combat biases by changing the overarching
social patterns. However, these social patterns are likely themselves the result of the biases
we are attempting to ameliorate. So, we can’t simply advocate that we fix these issues by
electing more women and people of color. However, as a more modest upshot, it can serve
to bolster a critical insight from equality advocates that representation matters.31
Secondly, and more problematically, there often exists a complex tradeoff between re-
liance on proxy attributes and accuracy judgements. Because our world is shaped by
historical patterns of oppression, often the best available indicators for some classification
task will necessarily serve as proxies for membership in marginalized groups. Take, for
30See Byrd 2019 for a review of the effectiveness of cognitive debiasing strategies that utilize counter-
stereotypical training (i.e., counterconditioning) and what this effectiveness entails for theories of social
cognitive bias-constructs.
31It additionally bolsters the point that combating problematic biases will require a two-pronged solution
that focuses both on the individual and structural level. See Antony 2016 and Huebner 2016, as well as the
debate between so-called ‘structural prioritizers’ and ‘anti-anti-individualists’, including Haslanger 2015,
2016b,a, Ayala Lopez 2016, 2018, Ayala Lopez and Vasilyeva 2015, Ayala Lopez and Beeghly 2020, Madva
2016, and Soon 2019.
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example, the fact that women are underrepresented in philosophy. Some hiring committee
aware that this is partly the result of explicit and implicit biases toward women in phi-
losophy might anonymize applications in an attempt to eliminate the effects a candidate’s
gender has on her application. Instead, they decide to rely on “purely objective” features of
the application, like publication rate. But these seemingly objective features often correlate
with gender, thus making them unwitting proxies. For whatever reasons—whether they be
from pervasive individual-level biases or structural injustices—the percentage of published
papers by female authors in philosophy is extremely low.32 So, reliance on publication
record will inevitably disadvantage women. But, on the other hand, doesn’t publication
record seem like a reasonable metric by which to make hiring decisions? If the committee
eliminates it from their decision-making criteria, then they arguably limit their chances
of accurately identifying worthwhile candidates, at least insofar as worthwhile is taken to
align with traditional metrics of academic success. Moreover, it’s not clear that there exist
any alternative criteria that wouldn’t raise similar concerns.33
Thus, a dilemma arises: due to patterns of oppression being so deeply engrained in
our social environment, the more we eliminate reliance on proxy attributes in decision-
making, the more likely it is that we’ll have an inaccurate and ineffective decision-making
procedure.34 This is because our standards for accuracy have been shaped by the social
environment, which has itself been shaped by oppressive structures. This tradeoff be-
32Wilhelm et al. (2018) put the percentage between 14-16%, despite women constituting closer to 25% of
all philosophy faculty and 50% of the general population. See also analyses of the number of publications in
philosophy by female authors (and the underrepresentation of women in philosophy in general) presented
in Paxton et al. 2012, Saul 2013, Jennings and Schwitzgebel 2017, Nagel et al. 2018, and Kings 2019.
33I am forced to simplify a complex discussion about what makes for “accurate judgements of being a
worthwhile candidate.” For reasons this discussion brings out, traditional metrics of academic success, e.g.,
standards for tenure promotion, will have baked into them (potentially problematic) preconceptions that
will often track structural inequalities. Thus, to be “accurate” with respect to those standards will entail
alignment with problematic social trends. We could adopt different measures of success, e.g., contributions
to diversity, that don’t have baked into them those same preconceptions. However, these other metrics would
arguably have baked into them some other preconceptions that are themselves morally- and politically-laden.
I discuss in more detail how seemingly neutral notions like ‘accuracy’ are potentially value-laden in my “Are
Algorithms Value-Free?” (MS). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to be more explicit about
these points and for noting how the idea of a “forced choice” between inclusivity and excellence likely
requires an overly narrow conception of excellence. See also Stewart and Valian 2018, 212-213.
34Indeed, as an anonymous referee points out, this is arguably evidence that a “colorblind” approach
that attempts to ignore socially-sensitive features is misguided to begin with. Alternative to this approach
could be to explicitly code for the socially-sensitive features, i.e., allow explicit reference to features like
race in the program, so as to overtly counter-balance the effects caused by the Proxy Problem. This follows
Anderson (2010, 155-156)’s discussion of how color-conscious policies are required in order to end race-based
injustice. I agree, but leave more detailed consideration of these alternative strategies for future work.
20 of 26
Algorithmic Bias
tween demands of epistemic reliability and demands of morality has already received much
attention in the domain of human reasoning about members of social groups.35 It high-
lights another way that issues surrounding algorithmic bias are not unique to algorithmic
decision-making, the extent to which the sources of biases can be common between the
two domains, and how theorizing about bias in one domain can enhance our understanding
of bias in the other. Future work in the ethics and epistemology of machine and human
decision-making procedures that rely on biases will require recognizing this tradeoff and
reasoning carefully about how best to balance it. For now, the dilemma makes clear that
there are no purely algorithmic solutions to the problems that face algorithmic bias.
5 Conclusion
Inquiries regarding the nature of bias and the utility of comparing its existence in both
machine and cognitive domains are still in their infancy. However, preliminary results
showing the usefulness of these comparisons have been positive. This paper aimed to
highlight just a few of these positive results, while gesturing at the many avenues such
comparisons open for further, fruitful philosophical engagement. I end by reflecting on
reasons we might be averse to this general comparison, given that it implies humans and
computers are capable of similar psychological capacities. For the same reason we resist
saying that a computer has any beliefs, desires, or emotions, we might also want to resist
attributing to them biases proper.
Although I think that the similarities I’ve highlighted facilitate robust predictive and
explanatory exchange between biases in the machine and cognitive domains, my account
leaves open that there might still be philosophical reasons for distinguishing between them.
For example, theories of content in philosophy of language might individuate the repre-
sentations involved in the input-output profile of human biases from the contents involved
in algorithmic biases. Similarly, theories of moral responsibility and blame in ethics and
value theory might provide philosophically important reasons for regarding the biases that
operate in human agents as entirely distinct from the biases that operate within machine
learning programs. There also exist potential empirical discovers that could undermine the
comparison, e.g., if it turns out that human cognitive biases are constitutively affective and
that artificial intelligence might be incapable of manifesting affective attitudes. My point
35Gendler (2011), Basu (2018, 2019), Bolinger (2018), and Munton (2019a), among others.
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is not to deny that these other theories might eventually provide reasons for distinguishing
between the two, but rather to resist at the onset foreclosing the possibility that these
investigations might go the other way, or that there are other explanatory projects for
which the identification is apt.
Finally, although I see on the horizon tempting philosophical reasons to avoid say-
ing computers are biased in the same way humans are, I also feel there are pragmatic
considerations that motivate this comparison, as it clearly highlights valuable avenues of
philosophical inquiry explored in one area that have been unexplored in the other. My
discussion in this paper of emergent biases and the Proxy Problem are examples of such
avenues. Along similar lines, it seems to me there exist interesting questions regarding
what constitutes a bias in the first place and whether it is even possible to entirely elim-
inate biases within a person or program that likewise benefit from exchange between the
two domains.
In summary, this account is not intended to argue that algorithmic and cognitive biases
are similar in all respects; rather, it is intended as a starting point for comparisons be-
tween the two. This starting point might eventually enable us to see important differences
between the two cases, or it might enable us to see the similarities; in both cases, however,
it will lend to a better understanding of bias.36
36This paper has been in the works for a while, so I have many to thank for its development over the
years. Firstly, thanks to Tatyana Kostochka for drawing the illustrations used to make the figures. For
comments and discussion about the paper, thanks to Josh Armstrong, Rima Basu, Erin Beeghly, Re-
nee Bolinger, Michael Brownstein, Elisabeth Camp, David Chalmers, Sam Cumming, Gabe Dupre, Tina
Eliassi-Rad, Maegan Fairchild, Branden Fitelson, Daniel Fogal, Deborah Hellman, Pamela Hieronymi,
Justin Humphreys, Amber Kavka-Warren, Seth Lazar, Travis LaCroix, Dustin Locke, Alex Madva, Eric
Mandelbaum, Annette Martin, Jessie Munton, Eleonore Neufeld, Sara Protasi, Chelsea Rosenthal, Ronni
Gura Sadovsky, Ayana Samuel, Susanna Schellenberg, Susanna Siegel, Seana Shiffrin, Joy Shim, and An-
nette Zimmermann. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Vancouver Summer Philosophy
Conference at the University of British Columbia, Athena in Action at Princeton University, Philosophy of
Machine Learning: Knowledge and Causality at University of California, Irvine, and Bias in Context Four
at the University of Utah. Finally, I want to acknowledge the helpful suggestions received from Nick Byrd




Adler, P., Falk, C., Friedler, S. A., Rybeck, G., Scheidegger, C., Smith, B., and Venkata-
subramanian, S. (2016). Auditing black-box models for indirect influence. In 2016 IEEE
16th International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM), pages 1–10. IEEE.
Alexander, L. (1992). What makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Biases, preferences,
stereotypes, and proxies. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 141(1):149.
Anderson, E. (2010). The Imperative of Integration:. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., and Kirchner, L. (2016). Machine bias: There’s soft-
ware used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks.
ProPublica.
Antony, L. (2001). Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology.
In Antony, L. and Witt, C. E., editors, A Mind Of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on
Reason and Objectivity, pages 110–153. Westview Press.
Antony, L. (2016). Bias: Friend or Foe? In Brownstein, M. and Saul, J., editors, Implicit
Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, pages 157–190. Oxford
University Press.
Ayala Lopez, S. (2016). Comments on Alex Madva’s ‘A plea for anti-anti-individualism:
how oversimple psychology mislead social policy’. Ergo Symposium.
Ayala Lopez, S. (2018). A Structural Explanation of Injustice in Conversations: It’s about
Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 99(4):726–748.
Ayala Lopez, S. and Beeghly, E. (2020). Explaining Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias,
and Individuals. In Beeghly, E. and Madva, A., editors, Introduction to Implicit Bias:
Knoweldge, Justice, and the Social Mind. Routledge.
Ayala Lopez, S. and Vasilyeva, N. (2015). Explaining Injustice in Speech: Individualis-
tic vs. Structural Explanation. In Dale, R., Jennings, C., Maglio, P. P., Matlock, T.,
Noelle, D. C., Warlaumont, A., and Yoshimi, J., editors, Proceedings of the 37th Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society., pages 130–135. Cognitive Science Society.
Basu, R. (2018). The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs. Philosophical Studies.
Basu, R. (2019). What we epistemically owe to each other. Philosophical Studies,
176(4):915–931.
Beeghly, E. (2015). What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping? Hypatia, 30(4):675–691.
23 of 26
Algorithmic Bias
Blum, L. (2004). Stereotypes And Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis. Philosophical Papers,
33(3):251–289.
Bolinger, R. J. (2018). The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generaliza-
tions. Synthese.
Byrd, N. (2019). What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing exper-
iments. Synthese.
Caliskan, A., Bryson, J. J., and Narayanan, A. (2017). Semantics derived automatically
from language corpora contain human-like biases. Science, 356(6334):183–186.
Chouldechova, A. (2016). Fair prediction with disparate impact: A study of bias in recidi-
vism prediction instruments. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.07524.
Corneille, O. and Hutter, M. (2020). Implicit? What Do You Mean? A Comprehensive
Review of the Delusive Implicitness Construct in Attitude Research. Personality and
Social Psychology Review, page 108886832091132.
Datta, A., Tschantz, M. C., and Datta, A. (2015). Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy
Settings. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2015(1).
Daume´ III, H. (2015). A Course in Machine Learning. https://ciml.info/.
Eberhardt, J. L., Goff, P. A., Purdie, V. J., and Davies, P. G. (2004). Seeing Black: Race,
Crime, and Visual Processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6):876–
893.
Epstein, A. (2016). Fox News’s biggest problem isn’t the Ailes ouster, it’s that it’s average
viewer is a dinosaur. Quartz Media.
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police and
Punish the Poor. St. Martin’s Press.
Gawronski, B., Hofmann, W., and Wilbur, C. J. (2006). Are “implicit” attitudes uncon-
scious? Consciousness and Cognition, 15(3):485–499.
Gendler, T. S. (2011). On the epistemic costs of implicit bias. Philosophical Studies,
156(1):33–63.
Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., Hirsh, H. K., and Blair, I. V. (2014). Awareness of implicit
attitudes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(3):1369–1392.




Haslanger, S. (2016a). Comments on Alex Madva’s ‘A plea for anti-anti-individualism:
how oversimple psychology mislead social policy’. Ergo Symposium.
Haslanger, S. (2016b). What is a (social) structural explanation? Philosophical Studies,
173(1):113–130.
Hellman, D. (2019). Measuring Algorithmic Fairness. Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper, pages 2019–39.
Holroyd, J., Scaife, R., and Stafford, T. (2017). What is implicit bias? Philosophy Compass,
12(10):e12437.
Holroyd, J. and Sweetman, J. (2016). The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias. In Brown-
stein, M. and Saul, J., editors, Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume 1: Metaphysics and
Epistemology, pages 80–103. Oxford University Press.
Huebner, B. (2016). Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cog-
nition. In Brownstein, M. and Saul, J., editors, Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume
1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, pages 47–79. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming
in Brownstein and Saul, eds. Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume I: Metaphysics and
Epistemology, Oxford University Press.
Jennings, C. and Schwitzgebel, E. (2017). Women in Philosophy: Quantitative Analy-
ses of Specialization, Prevalence, Visibility, and Generational Change. Public Affairs
Quarterly, 31.
Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substi-
tution in Intuitive Judgment. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D., editors,
Heuristics and Biases: the psychology of intuitive judgement, pages 49–81. Cambridge
University Press, 1 edition.
Kings, A. E. (2019). Philosophy’s Diversity Problem: Understanding the Underrepresen-
tation of Women and Minorities in Philosophy. Metaphilosophy, 50(3):212–230.
Klare, B. F., Burge, M. J., Klontz, J. C., Vorder Bruegge, R. W., and Jain, A. K. (2012).
Face Recognition Performance: Role of Demographic Information. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, 7(6):1789–1801.
Kleinberg, J., Mullainathan, S., and Raghavan, M. (2016). Inherent trade-offs in the fair
determination of risk scores. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.05807.
Lowry, S. and Macpherson, G. (1988). A blot on the profession. British medical journal
(Clinical research ed.), 296(6623):657.
Madva, A. (2016). A plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: how oversimple psychology misleads
social policy. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 3.
25 of 26
Algorithmic Bias
Miconi, T. (2017). The impossibility of “fairness”: a generalized impossibility result for
decisions. arXiv:1707.01195 [cs, stat]. arXiv: 1707.01195.
Monin, B. (2003). The Warm Glow Heuristic: When Liking Leads to Familiarity. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(6):1035–1048.
Munton, J. (2019a). Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations.
Philosophical Issues, 29(1):228–240.
Munton, J. (2019b). Bias in a Biased System: Visual Perceptual Prejudice. In Bias, Reason
and Enquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology.
Oxford University Press.
Nagel, M., Peppers-Bates, S., Leuschner, A., and Lindemann, A. (2018). Feminism and
Philosophy. The American Philosophical Association, 17(2):33.
Narayanan, A. (2016). Language necessarily contains human biases, and so will machines
trained on language corpora.
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of Math Destruction: How big data increases inequality and
threatens democracy. Crown Publishing Group.
Paxton, M., Figdor, C., and Tiberius, V. (2012). Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empir-
ical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy. Hypatia, 27(4):949–957.
Price, R. (2016). Microsoft is deleting its AI chatbot’s incredibly racist tweets. Business
Insider.
Saul, J. (2013). Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Women in Philosophy. In Hutchison,
K. and Jenkins, F., editors, Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?, pages 39–60.
Oxford University Press.
Soon, V. (2019). Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach. Philo-
sophical Studies.
Stephens-Davidowitz, S. (2014). Opinion | Google, Tell Me. Is My Son a Genius? The
New York Times.
Stewart, A. J. and Valian, V. (2018). An Inclusive Academy: Achieving Diversity and
Excellence. MIT Press.
Wilhelm, I., Conklin, S. L., and Hassoun, N. (2018). New data on the representation of
women in philosophy journals: 2004–2015. Philosophical Studies, 175(6):1441–1464.
Wu, X. and Zhang, Z. (2016). Automated Inference on Criminality using Face Images.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.04135.
26 of 26
